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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Ten years after the Supreme Court decided Brown v. Board of 
Education,1 now a symbol of the beginning of the end of racial 
discrimination, Congress passed Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964.2  Title VII opened the workplace to all races and women in ways 
that had not previously existed.  While discrimination in the workplace 
has not disappeared in the forty years since Title VII’s enactment, one 
sees minorities and women in a greater variety of jobs, and at higher 
levels,3 than one would have seen a generation ago.4 
The promise of Brown, however, has not been achieved.5  When one 
looks at public schools fifty years after Brown, a great number are still 
racially segregated, and those whose populations are made up primarily 
of minorities are often impoverished.6  Both Brown and Title VII 
identified the right to be free from discrimination, but that right was not 
self implementing.  Eliminating discrimination required, and requires, 
effective remedies. 
This Article compares and contrasts the lack of success in desegregating 
the schools with the greater success in eliminating discrimination from 
the workplace and suggests that the workplace and schoolhouse can act 
together for the benefit of both.  Part II theorizes that Brown might, in 
 
 1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown I).  2. 42 U.S.C. §§  2000e–2000e-5 (2000). 
 3. See William L. Taylor, Brown, Equal Protection, and the Isolation of the 
Poor, 95 YALE L.J. 1700, 1704–08 (1986) (describing gains made by blacks in the workplace, but also noting that many blacks still lack opportunities); cf. Mary E. Becker, 
Needed in the Nineties: Improved Individual and Structural Remedies for Racial and 
Sexual Disadvantages in Employment, 79 GEO. L.J. 1659, 1669 (1991) (discussing the continuing existence of employment discrimination, but noting that empirical evidence shows employment gains for women and minorities because of Title VII as well as a change in cultural attitudes). 
 4. See DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND 
THE UNFULFILLED HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORM 139 (2004) (noting that even six years after passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 most institutions were predominantly composed of white males). 
 5. See id. at 136 (“[T]he promise of Brown proved a mirage.”); Mark Tushnet, 
The Significance of Brown v. Board of Education, 80 VA. L. REV. 173, 175 (1994) (describing a theory that Brown failed because schools did not become desegregated); Davison M. Douglas, Introduction, The Promise of Brown Forty Years Later, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 337, 339 (1995) (claiming Brown did not fulfill the expectation that it would end racial inequality); Jerome M. Culp, Jr., Black People in White Face: 
Assimilation, Culture, and the Brown Case, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 665, 668 (1995) (arguing that the Brown decision has failed to eliminate racial segregation in the U.S.); Cheryl Brown Henderson, The Legacy of Brown Forty Six Years Later, 40 WASHBURN L.J. 70, 76 (2000) (noting that the majority of African-American students in the United States remain in segregated schools). 
 6. See BELL, supra note 4, at 114, 127–29 (stating that schools and neighborhoods, particularly inner urban and rural, tend to be more segregated and worse off than before 
Brown). 
KOVACIC-FLEISCHER.DOC 8/21/2019  2:04 PM 
[VOL. 41:  1695, 2004]  Can Employers Now Help Schools? 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 1697 
hindsight, have been more successfully implemented7 and demonstrates 
why what might have been done earlier probably would not work today.  
Part III compares the plight of students who have not been helped by 
Brown with the plight of working parents whose family demands have 
kept them from sharing fully in the promise of Title VII.  It suggests, 
given the greater success of racial integration in the workplace than in 
the schoolhouse, that the workplace and schoolhouse might work together 
to benefit both.   
II.  DESEGREGATION DILEMMA 
A.  History 
In 1954, the U.S. Supreme Court held that governments violated the 
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution 
when they required schools to be segregated by race, even if the schools 
had equal resources, which in reality they rarely, if ever, had.8  To 
overrule Plessy v. Ferguson,9 the Court relied on findings by trial courts, 
whose cases were consolidated in Brown, that the schools were separate 
but being equalized.10  Plessy had held, in the context of seating on 
railway carriages, that separate but equal facilities for blacks and whites 
satisfied the demands of equal protection.11  A year after the Court in 
Brown overruled Plessy, it reviewed the remedial portion of the cases 
and ordered desegregation with “all deliberate speed.”12 
Desegregation orders by district courts implementing Brown were 
resisted and defied.13  In the new era of television, people around the 
nation and the world saw the ugly resistance and defiance, and the often 
 
 7. See generally WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION  SHOULD HAVE SAID: THE NATION’S TOP LEGAL EXPERTS REWRITE AMERICA’S LANDMARK CIVIL RIGHTS DECISION (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2001) (collecting alternative opinions from scholars); BELL, supra note 4, at 20–28 (writing an alternative opinion that Brown should have enforced the equality required by Plessy rather than overruling that case). 
 8. Brown I, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).  9. 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown I, 347 U.S. at 483. 
 10. Brown I, 347 U.S. at 492 & n.9 (summarizing trial court findings of “substantial equality” between black and while schools or school districts progressing in good faith toward equalizing schools). 
 11. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 548–49.  12. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (Brown II). 
 13. See BELL, supra note 4, at 19 (noting resistance to desegregation was “open and determined”); Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585, 588 (1983) (describing many types of resistance by whites to desegregation). 
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violent mistreatment of blacks by whites.14  Against this background of 
discrimination, and following the command of equality articulated by 
Brown, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964.15  Title VII of that 
Act prohibited employers and unions from discriminating against 
employees because of “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”16 Even after the passage of Title VII, courts were still struggling with 
how to desegregate the schools despite the fact that the Act had included 
Title VI, which prohibited institutions, including schools, that received 
federal funds from discriminating on the basis of race.17  Title VI did not 
provide a structure for desegregating schools; rather, it provided that 
federal funds would be withdrawn from institutions that discriminated.18  
Title VII provided a detailed approach for ending discrimination in the 
workplace. 
The major affirmative remedy under Title VII was “reinstatement or 
hiring” of employees discriminated against.19  Although school districts 
differed in substantial ways from employers, courts attempted a type of 
“instatement” remedy, inclusion of black students into white schools.  
Although faced with delaying tactics by states and school districts,20 
some trial courts ordered administrators of previously all white public 
schools to admit a few black students.21  Those courts, however, did not 
 
 14. See BELL, supra note 4, at 134 (listing the types of abuse covered by television journalists). 
 15. See id. at 135–36 (describing differing views as to whether the Civil Rights Act was enacted because of Brown or would have been enacted in any event at that time).  16. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)–2000(e)-2(b) (2000).  17. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000). 
 18. Id. § 2000d-1(1).  In the years following passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, regulations giving guidance for desegregation were promulgated pursuant both to Title VI, 29 U.S.C., and congressional acts that provided school funding.  The guidance was not explicitly provided in the congressional statutes.  See Neal Devins & James B. Stedman, New Federalism in Education: The Meaning of the Chicago School Desegregation 
Cases, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1243, 1245–57 (1984) (discussing regulations under Title VI and various education funding statutes).  19. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1). 
 20. See ROBERT J. COTTROL ET AL., BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION: CASTE, CULTURE, AND THE CONSTITUTION, 187–202 (2003) (describing many of the tactics used by school boards to delay implementation of desegregation); BELL, supra note 4, at 96, 212–13 & n.4 (describing delays from procedural issues raised in courts). 
 21. See, e.g., Adams v. Sch. Dist. No. 5, 232 F. Supp. 692, 698 (E.D.S.C. 1964) (ordering school district to admit six black children to white school); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 5, 14 (1958) (affirming court order to require white high school in Little Rock, Arkansas to admit a few black students); see also BELL, supra note 4, at 95 (describing resistance to admission of black students into white high school in Little Rock, Arkansas by governor of Arkansas); cf. Steiner v. Simmons, 111 A.2d 574, 579 (Del. 1955) (holding, in a case prior to the decision of Brown II, that school board exceeded its authority in ordering black students be admitted to white schools because the U.S. Supreme Court in Brown I had not yet ordered desegregation). 
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deal first with the reality that the segregated schools were separate and 
unequal.22 
Although Title VII and Brown both had the goal of ending discrimination, 
employers and schools have different functions.  Employers can choose 
among applicants and hire those needed for the work.  Public schools, on 
the other hand, educate everyone.  Thus, unlike school systems, most 
employers did not need to maintain separate but equal establishments to 
discriminate.  Employers could just exclude those whom they did not 
want.  At the time of Brown, in areas that permitted or required segregation, 
there were slots for blacks in black schools and whites in white schools.  
If those schools really had been separate but equal, as the Supreme Court 
had assumed, courts might have been able to desegregate schools by 
having a number of students trade places, sending some black students to 
white schools and some white students to black schools, especially in 
areas where the white and black schools were close together.  In many 
places, while public schools were segregated, neighborhoods were 
somewhat integrated.23 
Schools did not exchange students, however.24  Whether such an 
exchange would have worked will never be known, as the schools were 
not equal.  While there were many talented and dedicated black teachers, 
the schools were seriously underfunded and lacked facilities and 
supplies.25  Because schools were unequal, large numbers of students 
could not immediately be integrated.  With only a few black students 
initially transferred to white schools, whites had safety in numbers while 
 
 22. The trial courts in three of the four cases consolidated in Brown had issued “equalization” orders to improve the black schools.  See Brown I, 347 U.S. 483, 486 n.1 (1954). 
 23. See, e.g., Adams, 232 F. Supp. at 698 (ordering school district to enroll black students in “the white schools to which they would be entitled as a white child living in the same school zone”); see also BELL, supra note 4, at 90–91 (describing courts’ approval, prior to Brown, of sending black students to black schools further from their homes than white schools).  24. See, for example, Norwalk Core v. Norwalk Board of Education, 423 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1970), in which the court affirmed denial of a temporary restraining order to close all black school pending outcome of plaintiff’s motion to have black and white children exchanged between black and white schools.  The court further refused to overturn the school board’s decision in a voluntary desegregation plan to close the minority school in an underprivileged area despite plaintiffs’ claim that closing the school and not busing children into it as well as out of it denied them equal protection because the school board was doing the best it could with existing resources.  Id. at 122, 124. 
 25. See BELL, supra note 4, at 124–25 (describing talent of teachers but disparities in school budgets). 
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a few black students had to bear the brunt of taunts and threats.26  Thus, 
courts ignored the racially separated schools’ inequality at the peril of 
integration, illustrating that assumptions in a liability phase should not 
necessarily be carried into the remedial phase. 
In hindsight, the courts might have tried a two-step remedy: courts 
might have first chosen to enforce the equality in “separate but equal,” 
and second ordered elimination of the “separate.”  How long the time 
between the two orders should have been, one year or a generation, is 
only a subject of debate, as this, too, did not occur.  The justices who 
decided Brown, however, did not have the benefit of hindsight.  Because 
an order to equalize the black and white schools would most likely have 
been viewed as a decision to delay or even obstruct desegregation, it was 
probably unavailable.27  If resources had been used to improve previously 
neglected black schools before desegregation, exchanging students between 
black and white schools might have been easier than sending a few black 
students to white schools.28  Of course, hostility toward the idea of 
putting black and white children in the same school would have still 
been an enormous impediment.  For example, county officials in Prince 
Edward County, Virginia, ordered the schools closed rather than have 
black and white children educated together.29 
In the employment field, the timing of Congressional legislation 
provides a picture of a brief “separate but equal” period.  One year 
before Congress passed Title VII, it passed the Equal Pay Act.30  That 
Act requires employers to pay women and men alike if both do the same 
work.31  Thus, the pay inequities between the sexes were addressed 
before the barriers to jobs were eliminated by Title VII.  One can 
roughly analogize correcting unequal pay disparities with correcting 
school disparities before eliminating barriers to entry.  Of course, the 
pay inequities were not corrected in a year, nor are they yet corrected, 
 
 26. See generally COTTROL ET AL., supra note 20, at 195 (describing marshals escorting four black girls to elementary to school amidst taunts and threats). 
 27. See generally BELL, supra note 4, at 27 (writing an alternative opinion to 
Brown directing resources to black schools to enforce Plessy, but acknowledging that such an opinion at the time would have been “condemned”). 
 28. See Gewirtz, supra note 13, at 652–53 (suggesting, before Jenkins was decided, that improving schools might decrease white resistance to desegregation). 
 29. See Griffin v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 225 (1964) (holding unconstitutional the county’s closing of public schools rather than having black and white children attend together); see also Jennifer E. Spreng, Scenes from the Southside: A Desegregation 
Drama in Five Acts, 19 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 327, 330 (1997) (describing history of Prince Edward County’s desegregation, including resistance of whites to desegregation despite financial hardship of resistance).  30. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2000).  31. During World War II, a temporary Labor Board prohibited wage differentials based on race.  See BELL, supra note 4, at 132–33. 
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but men knew (and know) that they would not be penalized by the 
improvement of women’s salaries because the Act prohibited employers 
from reducing any salaries to equalize pay.32  Similarly, Brown might 
have ordered disparities between schools to be remedied, and then 
ordered that segregation be eliminated, with the idea that no student 
transferred would be disadvantaged by the transfer.  Ironically, years 
after Brown was decided, courts did order that disparities among schools 
be remedied, but times and neighborhoods had changed, and that remedy 
was too late. 
In recent years, some school districts that were under court orders for 
having unconstitutionally segregated schools have been permitted to 
terminate judicial supervision.  It is not necessary for those school districts 
to prove that desegregation has been eliminated, but to show a good faith 
effort to do what they could to eliminate segregation.33  The effects of 
“white flight” were held to be beyond the control of the courts.34 
B.  Separate But Equal Too Late 
1.  White Flight 
In Missouri v. Jenkins, the trial judge ordered, over the course of a 
number of years, that the Kansas City school system make major 
improvements.35  These remedies were necessary, the court held, to 
eliminate the vestiges of unconstitutional segregation and to attract back 
nonminority students whose parents had fled to the suburbs or enrolled 
them in private schools.36  The judge noted the difficulty of desegregating a district that was 68.3% black,37 but was unable to order that students in 
the suburbs be exchanged with those who remained in Kansas City 
 
 32. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1). 
 33. See Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 471 (1992) (holding that judicial supervision of school districts can be terminated in incremental stages); Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 250 (1991) (remanding to the district court to assess whether school board complied in good faith with past decrees and eliminated vestiges of discrimination “to the extent practicable”).  See generally Wendy Parker, The Future of 
School Desegregation, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1157 (2000) (analyzing desegregation cases, noting many have terminated jurisdiction but concluding there is still a role for courts in desegregating schools). 
 34. Dowell, 498 U.S. at 250 n.2 (noting that the district court had found residential segregation not to be a vestige of prior school desegregation).  35. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 75–80 (1995) (Jenkins III). 
 36. Id. at 74, 76–77. 
 37. Id. at 76. 
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because of the Supreme Court’s decision in Milliken v. Bradley.38  In 
Milliken, the Court invalidated a city-suburban student exchange remedy 
in Detroit, holding that the remedy for segregation could not go beyond 
the city’s political boundaries unless the outlying political subdivisions 
had also been responsible for the unconstitutional desegregation.39  
Because the suburbs around Detroit had not discriminated, the Court 
reasoned that they could not be included in the remedy.40  The judge in 
Missouri v. Jenkins had similarly found that the suburbs of Kansas City 
were not guilty of intentional discrimination.41 
Missouri v. Jenkins made three trips to the Supreme Court.42  The 
Supreme Court, in its third opinion, held that the ambitious remedy was 
beyond the scope of the constitutional violation.43  The existing segregation 
was no longer the result of state action, but rather was the result of 
housing patterns.  Whites who could afford to move had fled to the suburbs 
or private schools to avoid the results of segregation.44  Presumably they 
fled not solely because of racial prejudice, but also because of concern 
about the quality of the public schools.45  Thus, the trial court in 
Missouri v. Jenkins had sought to alleviate that latter concern by trying 
to correct the effects of segregation and to recapture the whites who had 
fled.  Had some of the previously black schools not been inferior to the 
white ones, perhaps some of the white flight to the suburbs would not 
have occurred.46  Once it had occurred, however, it was hard to reverse.  
Presumably it is easier to entice a family to stay put, than to entice one to 
return.  Once a family has gone to the effort and expense of relocating, 
the family probably is not inclined to relocate again.  And the family 
who did not move physically, but enrolled its children in private schools, 
probably does not want its children to change schools again.  Had there been 
less white flight to the suburbs, desegregation might have been easier to 
achieve.  Ironically, then, the remedy in Missouri v. Jenkins came too late. 
 
 38. Id. (citing Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (Milliken I), aff’d, 433 U.S. 267 (1977) (Milliken II)). 
 39. Milliken I, 418 U.S. at 745. 
 40. Id. at 752. 
 41. Jenkins III, 515 U.S. at 95.  42. The first involved attorneys’ fees.  Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274 (1989) (Jenkins I), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 495 U.S. 33 (1990), rev’d, 515 U.S. 70 (1995).  The second is described infra in the text accompanying notes 56–57. 
 43. Jenkins III, 515 U.S. at 94. 
 44. Id. at 94–95. 
 45. See BELL, supra note 4, at 112 (“[I]nferiority of black schools kept white families from moving into predominantly black neighborhoods.”).  See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, The Segregation and Resegregation of American Public Education: The 
Courts’ Role, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1597, 1605–09 (2003) (describing causes of white flight). 
 46. Cf. Gewirtz, supra note 13, at 652–53 (suggesting, before Jenkins was decided, that improving schools might decrease whites’ resistance to desegregation). 
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2.  Cost 
The Equal Pay Act required a number of private employers to increase 
women’s wages.47  Thus, a type of private antidiscrimination “tax” was 
imposed.  That tax was either passed on to consumers or taken out of 
employers’ profits to compensate for past economic discrimination of 
women.  If courts had ordered school districts to allocate resources to 
equalize black and white schools as a first step, the costs imposed also 
would have been an antidiscrimination tax.  Public schools, however, do 
not have profits to trim or customers to absorb costs.  Public schools rely 
on the levy of “real” taxes. 
A generation before the judge in Missouri v. Jenkins ordered the 
Kansas City public schools to be improved, courts enforcing Brown 
ordered desegregation rather than improvements to neglected black 
schools.48  Had they ordered improvements, given the long period of 
neglect, the amount of money needed would probably have been 
enormous,49 as it was in Jenkins.50  In hindsight, again, that amount 
might have been less than the costs caused by active opposition that 
followed desegregation orders51 and the costs of busing and other later 
orders.52  Of course the courts might have had to use their contempt 
powers had school boards refused to raise and allocate money to the 
neglected black schools.53  Failure to allocate resources in the past was 
 
 47. See generally HEIDI HARTMANN ET AL., EQUAL PAY FOR WORKING FAMILIES: NATIONAL AND STATE DATA ON THE PAY GAP AND ITS COSTS (1999) (providing examples of companies that have had to make back payments in order to adjust for wage discrimination). 
 48. See supra notes 27–33 and accompanying text.  49. The school board in the Delaware case consolidated with Brown in the Supreme Court had chosen desegregation as a cheaper alternative than equalizing the black and white schools.  See BELL, supra note 4, at 25 (describing, in an alternative opinion, the experience of the Delaware case).  50. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 78–79 (1995) (Jenkins III) (describing more than $500 million in court ordered capital improvements and $200 million in court ordered salary increases).  51. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on 
Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062, 2091 (2002) (describing the effects after the Brown I decision, generally mentioning the refusal of some school districts to desegregate and particularly detailing the events in Little Rock, Arkansas where the governor directed the school district to defy the Brown I decision). 
 52. See, e.g., Milliken II, 433 U.S. 267, 290 (1977) (holding that compensatory and remedial programs are permissible to correct segregation); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 30 (1971) (permitting courts to order busing of students to correct segregation). 
 53. Cf. Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265, 267 (1990) (holding district court 
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one of the reasons the schools were inadequate in the first place.54  On 
the other hand, localities might have felt that they were buying time 
from desegregation orders and allocated the funds as the lesser of two 
evils.  Perhaps, during the period of time that schools were improved, 
some attitudes about desegregation might have changed or opposition to 
integration might have lessened. 
While transferring students between equally good schools might have 
been more palatable than sending a few black children to white schools, 
a case that reached the Supreme Court a decade after Brown illustrates 
how far school officials would go to avoid desegregation. In Griffin v. 
County School Board, school officials closed public schools rather than 
integrate them.  The Supreme Court upheld the trial judge’s order to the 
officials to open the schools and levy taxes.55  A generation later, in 
Jenkins, the Supreme Court invalidated the trial judge’s order imposing 
taxes to pay for the ordered school improvement.56  Citing Griffin, the 
Court held that while federal courts have the power to order officials to 
levy taxes, the trial court in Jenkins abused its discretion by imposing a 
tax itself.57  Query whether the taxing order, like the improvement 
remedy, came too late. 
3.  Courts or Legislatures 
Whether the local governments order a tax increase or whether a court 
imposes one relates to a more general question of the relationship 
between courts and legislatures.  In comparing remedies for employment 
and educational discrimination, one notes that the employment remedies 
were enacted by Congress, while the desegregation remedies were 
ordered by courts.  Although one would expect a constitutional right to 
education consistent with the equal protection clause to be enforced 
more vigorously than a statutory right to freedom from discrimination in 
both private and public workplaces, it may at times be the reverse.  
 
abused its discretion in holding city council members personally in contempt without waiting to see if order against city would be effective in achieving the city’s compliance with a consent decree in housing discrimination case).  See generally COTTROL ET AL., 
supra note 20, at 196–97 (describing contempt order against Governor of Mississippi’s opposition to James Meredith’s attendance at the University of Mississippi). 
 54. See generally BELL, supra note 4, at 15 (describing disparities between funding for black and white schools).  55. Griffin v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 233 (1964).  56. Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 51–52 (1990) (Jenkins II), rev’d, 515 U.S. 70 (1995). 
 57. Id. at 51–52, 55–56 (citing Griffin, 377 U.S. at 233 (upholding court order to county officials, who had closed the public schools rather than desegregate them and had contributed to the support of white private schools, to open public schools and raise taxes to support them)). 
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While there may not be universal support for a particular law, statutes 
are enacted pursuant to a democratic concept of elected officials 
following the will of the majority.58  In addition, statutes can be enacted 
after hearings, detailed study, and consideration of broad ramifications.  
Statutes can delineate a complex remedial scheme, phase in relief, and 
design specific penalties to deter disobedience.59 
Federal judicial decisions, however, are indirectly democratic.  
Federal judges are appointed by those who are elected, but then the 
judges and justices serve for life and their salaries cannot be reduced.60  
Because judges are protected from reprisal, federal judges theoretically 
are able to reach conclusions that do not have majority support.61  
Almost by definition, one area that might not have majority support is 
protection of minority rights.  It becomes ironic that while one of the 
roles of the federal judiciary is to protect the rights of minorities, 
enforcement of those rights may depend on the support of the majority.62 
Had Congress had the support to pass a statute to implement Brown 
shortly after it had been decided, schools might be more integrated 
today.  While Congress did pass Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, it did not provide statutory guidance for desegregation63 the way 
Title VII of the same act provided a remedy for employment 
discrimination. 
 
 58. See Susan Bandes, Reinventing Bivens: The Self-Executing Constitution, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 289, 323 (1995) (noting the perception that legislation is democratic and the practicality that unpopular legislation will probably not be enacted). 
 59. See id. at 322–25 (stating that the Congress can consider the broad implications of a matter, hold hearings, commission studies, and appropriate funds to enforce the remedy).  60. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 61. See Bandes, supra note 58, at 303–04 (noting that courts protect civil liberties); 
id. at 323 (noting that the “politically insulated federal judiciary” can make unpopular decisions); Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction As Injury: Transforming the 
Meaning of Article III, 113 HARV. L. REV. 924, 1014–15 (2000) (stating that the guaranteed life tenure for judges enables them to be independent of political pressure, but that the independence is limited by the judiciary’s reliance on Congress for funding the courts’ administrative staff). 
 62. See generally BELL, supra note 4, at 21 (writing an alternative Brown opinion saying that the “outraged resistance [of whites] could undermine and eventually negate even the most committed judicial enforcement efforts” to desegregate the schools). 
 63. See supra text accompanying notes 17–18. 
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III.  EXCHANGE THE NEIGHBORHOOD SCHOOL FOR                                           
THE WORKPLACE SCHOOL 
A.  A Suggestion 
While the idea of desegregating neighborhood schools may be 
unrealistic after more than a generation of white flight and the limits set 
by the Supreme Court in Milliken and Jenkins, perhaps it is time for the 
schools to leave the neighborhood and move to the workplace.  Schools 
would “move” to the workplace if children could attend schools, either 
existing or newly built, where a parent works.64  If so, then the 
demographic composition of schools might change.  This suggestion 
would require, at a minimum, a re-examination of the neighborhood 
school concept, the cooperation of a number of jurisdictions, whether 
they be different school districts or different states, and money.  Of 
course, having a school near a workplace would not be a particularly 
useful option if the school were poor.  In the case of urban settings, local 
schools may be those from which whites fled years ago. If employers 
saw the availability of nearby schools as a family friendly employment 
option, then they should have an incentive to see that the schools 
improved.  Employers might be able to provide money, time, or expertise to 
the schools or be able to interest local, state, or federal governments to 
do the same.65  Whether schools working with employers could improve 
would be a serious matter of debate, as school districts with poor schools 
are struggling with how to improve them.  A full “school-work” plan 
cannot be created in an essay, but a few benefits can be suggested.66  
B.  Desegregation Benefit 
Workplaces have become better integrated than neighborhoods and 
 
 64. See Candace Saari Kovacic-Fleischer, United States v. Virginia’s New Gender 
Equal Protection Analysis with Ramifications for Pregnancy, Parenting, and Title VII, 50 VAND. L. REV. 845, 907 (1997) (suggesting that students be permitted to attend school near a parent’s workplace); see also John C. Goodman, School Choice vs. School 
Choice, 45 HOW. L.J. 375, 387 (2002) (arguing that students should have a choice of schools not dependent upon the family income and noting that, in Barbados, parents can send their children to school where they live or work). 
 65. See, e.g., BELL, supra note 4, at 172–73 (describing the corporate support that the Frederick Douglass Academy in Harlem receives).  66. This Article does not solve problems with the “school-work” suggestion.  Whether schools could be improved with resources from without the school system is a large question.  Other problems suggest themselves: Who would fund the school?  How can children be attracted from neighborhood or private schools to a school near an employment center?  What would happen if an employee is terminated or resigns?  What happens when workplaces and neighborhoods are in different jurisdictions?  Who would elect the school board and make final decisions?  Who might be potentially liable and for what?  What type of transportation, if any would be provided?  And so on. 
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thus neighborhood schools.67  If schools were to follow employment 
patterns rather than housing patterns, more racial diversity should appear 
in the schools.  More economic diversity should also appear because 
people who work in the same place do not have the same salaries.68  
Children who have not been helped by Brown might benefit by having 
an alternative to a neighborhood school or a substitute, such as a charter 
school or vouchers.  Locating schoolrooms near workplaces could have 
advantages for employees and employers, too. 
C.  Employees’ Benefits 
Employees who are parents have been less well served than others by 
Title VII.  With more employment opportunities for women and minorities, 
more families with children have begun to have both parents in the 
workplace.  This has created a demand for childcare and other family 
accommodations, the lack of which has kept some parents, especially 
mothers, out of the workforce or underemployed.69  There are very few 
statutes that help parents balance family and work responsibilities.  Title 
VII provides that employers not discriminate against pregnant women.70  
The Family and Medical Leave Act71 provides job protection for 
employees of large companies who take twelve weeks of unpaid leave 
for the birth, adoption or serious illness of a child.  Neither of these 
statutes helps parents with the many demands they face.72  While a bill 
was introduced in Congress to protect parents from employment 
discrimination, it did not pass.73 
 
 67. See supra note 3.  68. Studies indicate that the same student will do better in a school in an affluent area than in a poor area.  See Peter Zamora, Note, In Recognition of the Special 
Educational Needs of Low-Income Families?: Ideological Discord and Its Effects upon 
Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Acts of 1965 and 2001, 10 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 413, 413–14 (2003) (reviewing studies of achievement levels of students depending upon income levels). 
 69. See generally Kovacic-Fleischer, supra note 64 (arguing that more family friendly arrangements in the workplace should be required by Title VII).  70. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2000).  71. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2654 (2000). 
 72. See Candace Saari Kovacic-Fleischer, Litigating Against Employment 
Penalties for Pregnancy, Breastfeeding and Childcare, 44 VILL. L. REV. 355, 355–57 (1999) (discussing the inadequacies of legal employment protections for childrearing). 
 73. See generally Peggie R. Smith, Parental-Status Employment Discrimination: A 
Wrong in Need of a Right?, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 569 (2002) (analyzing the proposed Discrimination Against Parents Act and other legislative alternatives to protect parents in the workplace). 
KOVACIC-FLEISCHER.DOC 8/21/2019  2:04 PM 
 
1708 
One of the major demands a parent faces is making sure a child is in a 
safe environment. For the middle class, that demand was often met by a 
mother at home.  With more parents no longer at home all, the need for 
daycare has expanded.74  A school near a parent’s workplace could 
fulfill two functions: education for the child and daycare for the parent.  
This would be particularly helpful if the school had hours coordinated 
with the workplace and educated children younger than those now 
considered “school aged.”  Besides providing peace of mind, it might enable 
a parent to spend more time with children by commuting together or 
being close enough to spend some time at the school.  Since parental 
involvement is frequently cited as an important factor in the success of a 
child,75 children and schools would benefit as well as parents. 
D.  Employer Benefits 
Employers could also benefit.  They lose productivity when their 
workers worry about whether they have enough time with their children 
or where they are.  Nearby schools might give parents peace of mind and 
employers a boost in productivity.  Many employers see that family 
friendly benefits help attract and retain good employees.76 
Some employers are concerned about a shrinking pool of educated 
workers, making it particularly important for them to be able to attract 
and retain employees.77  With schools available as family friendly 
benefits, both parents and employers would be invested in the success of 
the schools.  Better schools and better student success would contribute 
to better future workers.  Well-educated children would become another 
generation of employees.   
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The era of desegregation has created many ironies: the remedy of 
improving minority schools was ordered too late, the remedy of court 
ordered taxes was too late, congressional action was too little, and courts 
now have terminated judicial supervision of school districts without 
 
 74. See Kovacic-Fleischer, supra note 64, at 905–07 (discussing need for nonparental childcare because many women who traditionally had raised children at home are now in the workforce). 
 75. See Nancy Buchanan, The Effects of Parental Involvement on 12th Grade 
Achievement, 4 GEO. PUB. POL’Y REV. 75 (1998) (reviewing studies and conducting a study showing correlations between differing types of parental involvement and student success). 
 76. See Kovacic-Fleischer, supra note 64, at 905 n.337 (discussing employers who find family friendly policies cost effective). 
 77. See SYLVIA ANN HEWLETT, WHEN THE BOUGH BREAKS: THE COST OF NEGLECTING OUR CHILDREN 20 (1991). 
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having achieved desegregation of the schools.  The era of desegregation 
also created Title VII and much desegregation of the workplace.  Perhaps 
it would be possible to place schools in a location less segregated than 
the neighborhood.  Employers and school districts might want to 
consider a school-near-work because the interests of employers, 
employees, and children intersect with each other, and with the goal of 
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